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1. Introduction  
 
Across the globe, the implementation of prevention work at the local level taking into account 
the specific structures and conditions on the ground, is proposed to be helpful for its success – 
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Abstract 
In many cases of jihadist radicalisation, the direct environment perceived signs and/or 
knew about the plans of the individual to join a terrorist group (Gill et al., 2014, p. 
429). Yet, it can be assumed that only a small number of these persons reported their 
observations to the competent authorities. The fear of putting the relationship with the 
radicalising individual or themselves at risk can lead these persons to keep their 
observations a secret (Williams et al., 2015). This paper argues that the establishment 
of local points of contact where trained resources persons operate as so-called 
gatekeepers (Williams et al., 2015, p. 45) could be a meaningful step towards 
overcoming the lack of trust in the relevant CVE service providers. The establishment 
of these points of contact as exemplified by the regional prevention network of the 
Federal State Democracy Centre Baden-Wuerttemberg advances the crucial transition 
from prevention work to deradicalisation through the qualification of locally 
embedded resource persons. The points of contact can implement prevention strategies 
in the districts which are tailored to local requirements and specificities (White House, 
2015). Therefore, local points of contact operate at the intersection of prevention work 
and the federal deradicalisation unit. The concept of a regional prevention network 
demonstrates the possibility to establish an early warning system with respect to the 













particularly, in the long run (Sicherheitsverbund der Schweiz, 2016, p. 11; White House, 
2015). When cooperating with local partners from various professional backgrounds 
prevention work can pay attention to the multi-factored genesis of radicalisation (Vidino, 
2010, p. 11). 
The conception of preventive measures should be based on specific knowledge of the 
“why and how” (Koehler, 2017, p. 65) as Koehler emphasises. This holds also true for the 
inclusion of cooperation partners that should be involved in a prevention project based on 
their expertise and expected contributions within the framework of existing radicalisation 
theories.  
Beyond the realm of prevention work, it must be noted that scholars have not yet shed 
much light on deradicalisation work and, in particular, the transitionary phases from 
prevention to intervention. As research suggests, family members are usually the firsts to 
perceive the early signs of an individual’s radicalisation. However, these persons lack the 
capacity to adequately read and interpret these signs.  
„In 82.4% of the cases, other people were aware of the individual’s grievance that spurred the 
terrorist plot, and in 79%, other individuals were aware of the individual’s commitment to a 
specific extremist ideology. In 63.9% of the cases, family and friends were aware of the 
individual’s intent to engage in terrorism-related activities because the offender verbally told 
them“ (Gill et al., 2014, p. 429). 
Since Williams et al. (2015) point out, the psychological barrier of potential informants is 
very high due to a perception of betraying the individual’s confidence when reporting their 
observations to the authorities, it can be suspected that information is usually not forwarded to 
consulting services or security authorities. Hence, this deficit marks the weak spot of the 
chain of intervention. Moreover, often there is a significant lack of local contact persons as 
individuals who seek professional advice usually do so in their local environment, for instance 
at the local police station (Thomas et al., 2017). Thus, there is a strong need for the 
establishment of local points of contact that are competent to advise persons in need of 












are close to the individual in question (for example, family members). At the same time, the 
local contact point must keep an appropriate distance from the potentially radicalising 
individual to be able to deliver an unbiased assessment of his or her conduct and to introduce 
the appropriate measures. 
The concept of local prevention work which will be introduced in the subsequent 
chapters is aimed to improve the transitionary phases from prevention to deradicalisation 
work at the local level. In other words, its goal is to close the “critical disconnect” (Williams 
et al., 2015, p. 46) between persons that are close to the individual in question and those who 
can provide support and expertise. 
 
2. The prevention landscape in Germany: contextualisation of the prevention 
network PREvent!on 
 
A great diversity of projects and approaches characterises prevention work in Germany. 
Kemmesis et al. (2016) list 336 prevention projects across Germany established by the state 
or supported through public funds. These projects are linked to 43 public prevention actors 
(e.g. ministries or police agencies). It is safe to assume that the number of projects has grown 
in the last few years (Kober, 2017, p. 222). The federal programme “Live Democracy!” 
initiated by the Federal Ministry for Family Affairs, Senior Citizens, Women and Youth funds 
most of these projects2. The overall funding amounted to € 104.5 million in 2017. The goal of 
the federal programme is to promote projects and build structures which nurture “a diverse, 
non-violent and democratic society“ (Federal Ministry for Family Affairs, Senior Citizens, 
Women and Youth, 2017). 
 
„The federal programme's target groups include, in particular, children and young people, 
their parents, relatives and reference persons, and also volunteer, part-time and full-time child 
care workers, multipliers and governmental and civil society actors.“ (ibid) 
                                                 
2 Some states, among these Baden-Wuerttemberg, offer state programmes supported through those funds of the federal 
budget which are allocated to projects aiming to prevent radicalisation. Those projects are not part of the federal funding 












The concept of the federal programme „Live Democracy!” rests on two pillars. The first of 
these pillars is the establishment of sustainable structures. These structures provide for the 
systematic support of the promotion of democracy across Germany and/or capacity-building 
measures within NGOs which work towards preventing radicalisation. The establishment of 
the programme Partnerships for Democracy – “towns, boroughs and districts throughout 
Germany [which] are supported in developing and implementing strategies to promote 
democracy and diversity“ (ibid) as well as the Federal State Democracy Centres operating at 
state level in all 16 states – supplements this pillar. The Federal State Democracy Centres 
facilitate a network of relevant actors within the field in every state; they develop service tools 
and programmes aiming to prevent radicalisation, promote democracy and operate as points 
of contact regarding these topics at the state level. 
Pilot Projects constitute the second pillar of the federal programme “Live 
Democracy!”. These develop innovative approaches to preventing radicalisation and 
promoting democracy. The project staff work along seven thematic focus areas towards 
integrating these model approaches into the pre-existing pedagogical structures.  
Beyond the structures of the federal programme “Live Democracy!”, there is another 
network operating across Germany, and supervised by the Federal Agency for Migration and 
Refugees (BAMF). The service hotline radicalisation constitutes the single point of contact 
for people who notice signs of radicalisation within a person in their social environment. The 
staff of the hotline refer persons in need of support to local consultation service points which 
are partially funded through “Live Democracy!”. Here, trained professionals can offer direct 
support and advice.  
The German landscape of prevention work and its multitude of projects gives rise to 
many critical voices. Often, critics admonish the lack of a comprehensive national strategy 
and describe the existing structures as an uncontrolled growth of civil society initiatives 
(Steinke, 2017). According to Nordbruch however, the potential of civil society actors and the 
diversity of approaches are the backbone of successful prevention work (Nordbruch, 2017). 












Baden-Württemberg, 2016, p. 19) also stresses the need for a national strategy but points out 
that it is especially critical to develop a common set of criteria which offer some guidance for 
the area of deradicalisation work. Despite the plethora of publications addressing the topic 
radicalisation prevention, the field still remains at an embryonic state in Germany (Kober, 
2017, p. 239).  
This article aims to contribute to the systematisation of prevention work. It shall do so 
by collating a transparent summary of the applied concepts, and theoretical foundations, as 
Kober (2017, p. 237) and others demand – a crucial step towards the sustainable long-term 
development of the field. To this end, the article lists the conceptual and academic 
foundations which have provided guidance for the development of concrete measures, and the 
implementation hereof.  
The prevention network PREvent!on which is to be introduced in this article is part of 
the Federal State Democracy Centre Baden-Wuerttemberg and, within the context of “Live 
Democracy!”, an important manifestation of prevention work supervised by civil society in 
Germany as the Youth Foundation Baden-Wuerttemberg, a private foundation, coordinates the 
Federal State Democracy Centre Baden-Wuerttemberg. For the development of a prevention 
project, and hence for the project PREvent!on, a specific understanding of radicalisation is 
instrumental. The concept underlying PREvent!on will be presented subsequently. The 
introduction is based on the work of Coquelin and Ostwaldt (2018). Prior to the introduction 
of the concept, the author will spell out the implications of academic work for the approach 
pursued by the prevention network PREvent!on. 
 
3. Radicalisation – a concrete conception of a complex phenomenon 
 
Whenever we speak of radicalisation, we must be clear about what we mean by “radical”, and 
how we can define radicalism accordingly. This holds also true for prevention work. Before 
we can develop preventive measures, we must establish what exactly it is we want to prevent, 












Therefore, first, I must stress the relativity of radicalism. Radicalism is tied to a 
specific place at a specific time within a specific context. Terms such as “extreme” or 
“radical” require a certain understanding of what a particular society considers to be moderate 
or mainstream. Only when possessing this knowledge, one can characterise certain behaviours 
and opinions as deviant, hence “radical” or “extreme”. 
 
“What one society considers “radical”, will be consensus in another. And what is believed to be 
“extremist” today, may be a fundamental part of the state order tomorrow.” (Neumann, 2013, p. 4)  
 
Academic debate has produced a number of definitions for the term radicalisation, e.g. the 
adoption of the ideology of jihadist Salafism (Frindte et al., 2016, pp. 2–3). Another account 
of radicalisation describes it as a process, 
 
“which results in violent acts conducted by an individual or a group of individuals. Hereby, violence is 
closely linked to a socially, politically, and religiously motivated ideology which is rejected by the 
dominant political, social or cultural order.” (Khosrokhavar, 2016, p. 29)  
 
Scholars neither agree on the meaning of radicalisation, nor on the individual concepts 
amounting to the process of radicalisation (Pisoiu, 2012, p. 10; Sedgwick, 2010). For 
example, there is no consensus on the question whether or not violence necessarily constitutes 
an element of radicalisation (Koehler, 2017, pp. 67–68). Consequently, this debate led to the 
decision to discriminate between violent and non-violent radicalisation (Bartlett and Miller, 
2012) and to the introduction of the concept of activism as the antipode of radicalisation 
(McCauley and Moskalenko, 2009). 
Dalgaard-Nielsen defines radicalisation emphasising the personal development, rather 
than the outcome of radicalisation; it is the “growing readiness to pursue and support far-
reaching changes in society that conflict with, or pose a direct threat to, the existing order“ 












„[W]e use the term ´radicalisation´ to refer to a process of personal development whereby an 
individual adopts ever more extreme political or politico-religious ideas and goals, becoming 
convinced that the attainment of these goals justifies extreme methods.“ (Ongering, 2007, p. 3) 
When attempting to answer the question why first and foremost young people radicalise, 
scholars and practitioners agree that there is no uniform profile of individuals joining Salafist 
groups, traveling to Syria or Iraq or planning a terrorist attack in their home country. On the 
contrary, it is the seeming normality which becomes evident when examining those 
individuals’ backgrounds and biographies. Al-Lami asserts that “recent studies of ‘jihadists’ 
have shown that the common characteristic among them seems to be their ‘normality’ […]. In 
other words, it could be anyone.“ (Al-Lami, 2009, p. 3; see also Gill, 2007, p. 152; Silber and 
Bhatt, 2007, p. 8; Hasenclever and Sändig, 2011, p. 208). Based on this assumption, distilling 
factors with predicative character for the radicalisation of youths presents a major challenge. 
Without the knowledge of these factors, however, prevention work is groping in the dark.  
Building on the insights of the four big theory schools, the sociological approach 
(Roy, 2006; Khosrokhavar, 2016), framing theory (Sageman, 2004; Wiktorowicz, 2005), the 
empiricist school (Nesser, 2004), and the psychological approach (Horgan, 2005), three levels 
of radicalisation factors can be mapped out.  
 
Three levels of radicalisation 
In the recent past, scholarship on radicalisation has produced a multi-level model featuring – 
with respect to radicalisation factors – an individual level, a group level, and a society level. 
At the individual level, we can distinguish a multitude of factors. The International 
Centre For The Prevention of Crime (2015) lists 14 factors3 affecting the individual level. 
Mafaalani et al. (2016, p. 6) stress that social disintegration combined with so-called 
grievances are one of the most important explanatory models. The term grievances 
                                                 
3 These are: the socioeconomic level, employment, education, criminal behaviour, personal crisis, age (being 
young), gender (men), negative experiences, military training, national identity (exclusion and xenophobia), 
nationals/immigrants, search for identity, religion, mental health (International Centre For The Prevention Of 












encompasses all forms of social or structural discrimination or other negative environmental 
influences perceived by the individual. According to Neumann (2012), radical ideologies 
would not resonate with an individual if she or he did not perceive or experience any 
grievances. Grievances are thus the breeding ground for a radical ideology to thrive.  
 Sageman describes youths as “enthusiastic volunteers“ (2007, p. 1), i.e. young 
individuals aspiring to build a utopia that promises honour, glory, and respect – which life had 
so far denied them. Kruglanski et al. understand this impetus to join a radical group as a quest 
for significance“ (2014, p. 73) feeding of a deeply rooted human desire “to matter, to be 
someone, to have respect“ (ibid.). Kruglanski et al. (2014) consider this pursuit of control, 
self-esteem, skills, and success etc. to be a key explanatory variable when examining people’s 
motives to turn to radical groups. 
"In summary, the seeming heterogeneity of motives underlying engagement in terrorism boils 
down to a major underlying motivation - the quest for personal significance." (Kruglanski et al., 
2014, p. 74) 
What remains unclear is why many people who in fact, perceive grievances or experience 
discrimination do not choose to radicalise in order to escape their lives (Horgan, 2005). 
Insights on resilience factors remain a crucial research desideratum.  
At the group level, relationships within social networks are of major importance. 
Factors taking effect at the individual level are mostly absorbed at the group level and are 
integrated into dynamic, interdependent structures within the group. This is where grievances 
take their full effect. The Youth Justice Board (2012, pp. 27–28) summarises all radicalisation 
factors affecting the group level as pull factors4: solidarity, social and personal bonds, higher 
status within the group, self-confidence, adventure, and membership in the global Muslim 
community. These pull factors can also be applied to the aforementioned individual and 
society levels (vgl. RAN Issue Paper, 2016, p. 4). Five essential elements ultimately describe 
the characteristic interdependences at the group level (Bartlett et al., 2010, p. 31). Beyond the 
                                                 
4 Radicalisation can be understood as an interaction between push and pull factors (vgl. RAN Issue Paper (2016, 
p. 4)). Push factors are those which derive from an individual’s intrinsic motivation. Pull factors are those which 












perception of group-specific grievances (for instance, the discrimination or oppression of the 
Muslim community), an often-rudimentary knowledge of Islam is a key feature. Furthermore, 
a youth-specific quest for adventure – accompanied by the appeal of being part of a group 
which opposes common views in society – is a driving force. A third aspect is an increased 
sense of self-esteem vis-à-vis an individual’s status in the group. Within the context of 
radicalisation, the group level represents a mediating tier between the influential factors at the 
individual, and the society levels.  
At the society level, grand narratives take effect, for example the idea of a global war 
led by the West against all Muslims respectively Islamic states. In addition to incidents of 
discrimination experienced by a majority of Muslims (Frindte et al., 2012, p. 182; Brettfeld 
and Wetzels, 2007, pp. 104–108), Islamophobia is on the rise in Germany  (Decker et al., 
2016, p. 50; Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2015, p. 8). Also, failed social integration can result in an 
identification with the global community of Muslims, the “NeoUmma” (Khosrokhavar, 2016, 
p. 50), and a growing solidarity with Muslims living in war zones. The narrative of a global 
war against Muslims – an often-invoked concept in jihadist propaganda – is a very powerful 
motif among radical propagandists because in most cases, military intervention of Western 
states is directed at Islamic countries, notably at Iraq and Afghanistan. This has reinforced the 
belief in a conspiracy of the West against all Muslims. Not without reason, in a speech before 
the US Senate (2007) Marc Sageman demanded to withdraw all US troops from Iraq to 
deprive Al-Qaida of the foundation of their propagandist narratives. 
 
4. Radicalisation – theoretical models for practical application5 
 
Prevention work requires a sound, dependable, and in particular, a practical definition of 
radicalisation. The radicalisation of young individuals must be portrayed in a way that 
captures the complexities of radicalisation processes on the one hand, and allows for the 
generalisation of individual types and factors of radicalisation on the other hand. Moreover, in 
                                                 












the specific pedagogical context of prevention service providers, the definition of 
radicalisation must offer concrete points of reference for the development of measures and 
projects. A crucial basis for the conceptualisation of radicalisation is the consensus within 
scholarship on radicalisation: the processual quality and non-linearity of radicalisation which 
ultimately exclude monocausal relationships and emphasise multi-factored causes for 
individuals to radicalise  (Mafaalani et al., 2016, p. 3; Neumann, 2013, p. 3). 
Subsequently, the following part will briefly present a practice-oriented theory hereto, 
which – supplemented by practical advice and approaches – Coquelin and Ostwaldt (2018) 
recently established.  
 
Radicalisation as “De-pluralisation”  
Understanding radicalisation as de-pluralisation as suggested by Koehler (2017, pp. 74–80) 
allows us to grasp the radicalisation process in terms of an ideologization, and along with it, 
as an  
„individual depluralization of political concepts and values (e.g. justice, freedom, honor, violence, 
democracy), according with those concepts employed by a specific ideology“ (Koehler, 2017, p. 
74).  
This approach can explain radicalisation in a way that enables prevention workers, and 
ultimately, pedagogical practitioners to map the constitutive aspects of a radicalisation 
process and derive suitable preventive measures therefor. An increasing ideologization leads 
to a growing significance of those perceived problems which are interpreted based on a 
specific ideology. Therefore, deradicalisation and prevention work can be understood as “re-
pluralisation” (Koehler, 2017, p. 80), according to Koehler.  
The following fictive example concerning jihadist radicalisation can illustrate the 
process of ideologization in term of its de-pluralising effects: While prior to the inception of 
the radicalisation process, an individual may be prone to perceive a cashier’s impoliteness in 
the supermarket as the result of a bad temper or a short night, an increasing ideologization can 












the cashier’s attitude personally, and interpret the situation based on their acquired ideological 
frames. Now, the cashier’s behaviour is not just the result of a bad temper or a short night; the 
reason for his impoliteness – as the radicalising individual perceives it – is the cashier’s 
hostility towards the identity of a specific group consisting of Muslims, in the individual’s 
subjective assessment as a Muslim.  
This narrow interpretative framework noticeably reduces an individual’s options to 
confront perceived and experienced injustices. Radicalising youths supplement experienced 
discrimination by adding those incidents (e.g. the fictive situation at the supermarket cash 
register) which can only be assessed as hostile or discriminatory when viewed through the 
group-specific lens of growing ideologization. Common daily challenges are augmented with 
jihadist narratives, such as the motif of a Western alliance of crusaders waging war against the 
Muslim world, or the idea of an American-Jewish conspiracy against Muslims. These 
narratives enhance the quantity and force of the youths’ perceived problems. Using these 
ideological strategies, jihadist groups succeed in reducing – de-pluralising – the options at the 
individual level to such an extent that violence increasingly becomes the only viable course of 
action. 
 
Relative deprivation and cognitive opening 
Complex processes precede the de-pluralising effects of an appropriation by radical groups, 
and an accompanying ideologization. These processes can explain the vulnerability of young 
individuals who are particularly prone to join jihadist groups. Hence, prevention work 
depends on a theoretical model which can adequately describe the motives for youths to turn 
towards radical groups, and which can also serve as the basis for pedagogical measures 
therefor. Hence, this paper takes account of the “theory of relative deprivation” (Gurr (1970) 
as well as its sociological extension, the “theory of social disintegration” (Heitmeyer, 2008). 
These two theoretical models are supplemented by the approach of a “cognitive opening” 
(Wiktorowicz (2005). Subsequently, all three will be examined in terms of their applicability 












A vertical arrow can illustrate the understanding of relative deprivation underlying this 
paper (Coquelin and Ostwaldt, 2018). Along an axis from bottom to top, the social status can 
be noted. Multiple contexts define this status which varies among individuals – a crucial fact: 
The self-assessment of an individual’s satisfaction is relative and context-dependent. This 
understanding represents an interpretation of relative deprivation which is specifically tailored 
to the prerequisites of prevention work. Membership in a specific social group creates 
expectations towards one’s position vis-à-vis the whole of society. Based on this objectively 
attributable membership in a social group (for example, persons with a secondary school 
degree, or children of academics) combined with a subjective sense of belonging, for instance 
the self-assessment as an intellectual individual, a person formulates certain expectations 
towards their life and professional career. These expectations manifest at different levels. 
They cover the pursuit of economic success, and social advancement as well as more 
individual objectives. 
Furthermore, other features and/or affiliations affect a person’s expectations towards 
herself or himself. Faith, gender, skin colour, native language or other characteristics may 
constrain a person’s possibilities to participate in social structures. Individual and collective 
experiences of discrimination lead to the discouraging experience that an anticipated social 
status cannot at all or hardly be acquired. The discrepancy between an anticipated status, 
which is the result of various self-assessments and external attributions, objective and 
subjective experiences of discrimination, and other constraining factors such as calamities or 
bad health amount to an individual’s relative deprivation.  
Consequently, effects of relative deprivation can result in a cognitive opening, 
provided that they are not absorbed by an individual’s personal environment. Wiktorowicz 
(2004) depicts a corresponding phase in the Al-Muhajiroun model which can explain why 
particularly young people are susceptive to new and often-radical conceptions of the world. 
Wiktorowicz describes how youths due to personal crises or traumatic experiences (vgl. 
Koehler, 2017, p. 15; Fink and Haerne, 2008, p. 3) are prone to question traditional models of 












actors starts, aiming to link individual experiences of deprivation to respective world views 
and a clear-cut idea of good and bad while undermining the values of a democratic society.   
 
5. Implications for prevention work and deradicalisation 
 
The summary of the state of research reveals concrete implications for prevention work. 
Prevention work must take into account a plethora of forms, factors, and trajectories of 
radicalisation (Koehler, 2017, pp. 70–74). Most importantly, it must intervene where young 
people experience deprivation and feel limited in their self-efficacy. Treating radicalisation as 
a youth-specific phenomenon requires a high degree of sensitivity: It involves an unbiased 
assessment of radicalisation as a process that must not be condemned a priori but should be 
understood as an expression of perceived injustice.  
Consequently, prevention work that operates through pedagogical measures against 
the aforementioned mechanisms of radicalisation unfolds primarily at the local level 
(Williams et al., 2015, 45–46). Therefore, the listed elements of religiously motivated 
radicalisation can be countered primarily at the local level. Understanding radicalisation as 
depluralization stemming from the perception of individual deprivation and resulting in a 
cognitive opening allows for the prevention of these factors within an environment that 
prohibits the stigmatisation of radicalising individuals as “extremists”. The introduced 
concept can sensitise pedagogical professionals for problematic situations which may favour 
radicalisation. These situations may be countered by pedagogical measures designed to 
provide concrete alternatives to the dualistic narratives of ideologizing actors referring to a 
clear-cut friend-foe scheme take effect. The collaboration of actors with different professional 
backgrounds is essential due to the multi-faceted patterns of radicalisation. Therefore, 
prevention work that aims to counter grievances by re-pluralising opportunities at the 
individual and/or group levels should be rooted within the social environment of a radicalising 












the individual (United States Attorney’s Office Minneapolis, 2015; Los Angeles Interagency 
Coordination Group, 2015). 
The multi-factored genesis of radicalisation and the concept distilled thereof underline 
that the development of preventive measures requires a scientific foundation guided by 
(inter)national discourse. Contrastingly, the implementation of preventive measures can take a 
particularly strong effect within the immediate environment of young people. Hence, this is 
where prevention work must set in.  
Hereupon, prevention work can only succeed as a combination of top-down and 
bottom-up processes. Consequently, the strategic and structural development of prevention 
work should be advanced at a higher level. That way, on the one hand structural 
considerations drawn from the dialogue of academia, civil society, policy-makers and security 
authorities can be implemented into qualification measures directed at prevention work 
professionals. On the other hand, practitioners can provide feedback on the target group and 
the feasibility of proposed measures. This feedback provided by specialists and partner 
organisations that are in close contact with the young people in question is crucial for the 
conception of successful preventive measures. It ensures that the measures reach the 
respective target group and can be applied within the (pedagogical) context of the specialists 
on the ground. Moreover, it is important to determine the needs of practitioners in order to 
provide tailored services. This is where the interplay between top-down and bottom-up 
processes becomes fundamental: On the one hand, the needs of especially trained 
professionals on the ground are an important benchmark for the challenges which must be 
tackled. On the other hand, a global perspective entails the possibility to recognise 
problematic situations at an early stage, to monitor developments at the macro level and to 
translate them into practices at the micro level.  
The often project-centred focus of funding structures in Germany and the goal of 
prevention work to trigger positive long-term change present a paradox that is difficult to 
overcome. Thus, the local implementation of projects as well as the interlocking with control 












number of actors and institutions can directly apply their expertise within the existing 
structures of youth work, youth social work, social assistance, education, and (social) 
pedagogy. Moreover, a close networking of civil society and state actors facilitates the 
positive impact of existing structures. To that end, the establishment of an umbrella 
institution, which coordinates all activities and supervises the actor networks and initiatives, is 
fundamental. The subsequently introduced regionalisation concept of the Federal State 
Democracy Centre Baden-Wuerttemberg supported by its local contact points can exercise 
this intermediary function. 
Furthermore, the insights presented below can also be applied to the purposes of youth 
deradicalisation work. The advisory system currently present in the German Länder, and at 
the federal level prescribes a central service hotline at the state and at the federal level. When 
contacted through the hotline, staff send out trained professionals to the individual(s) in need 
of support. In view of the above-mentioned insights indicating a higher efficacy of prevention 
work tailored to a specific social environment it is safe to assume that this concept will also 
prove itself within the context of deradicalisation. At present, the centralised organisational 
structures of deradicalisation programmes prohibit an adjustment to the local particularities of 
young people’s social environment.  
 
The interface of prevention and deradicalisation 
If one thinks the regionalisation of prevention and deradicalisation through, the much-cited 
prevention triad6 in psychopathology (Caplan, 1964) reveals an intersection of the fields of 
secondary and tertiary (i.e. selective and indicated)7 prevention. The first phase of this triad, 
called primary prevention, does not target a specific group but all persons, based on the 
resources available in order to empower them to improve their self-efficacy. In contrast, 
secondary prevention especially targets individuals that reveal a number of concrete risk 
                                                 
6 Caplan developed a triad consisting of primary, secondary and tertiary prevention which is central for the 
current understanding and approach of prevention work (Caplan 1964). 
7 According to Gordon (1983) who coined the terms universal, selective and indicated as an alternative to the 












factors. The previous chapter has introduced these factors for the context of jihadist 
radicalisation. Tertiary prevention is aimed at people who are situated in clearly problematic 
situations, i.e. on the path to radicalisation. Measures of tertiary prevention attempt to prevent 
further escalation; they also support individuals to distance themselves from their extremist 
environment (Johansson, 2012, p. 3). 
In view of the practice of prevention work, the theory-based academic debate about the 
intersection between the secondary und the tertiary prevention has high practical relevance. 
Even though scholars have discussed the different stages of the prevention triad for years, 
scholarship has largely neglected the interlocking of prevention and deradicalisation work. 
Here, “interlocking” does not mean the amalgamation of concrete approaches. Much rather, it 
refers to a structural symbiosis of approaches when assessing individual cases, at the border 
area between prevention and deradicalisation. The question at what point one can speak of a 
risk situation with regard to an individual illustrates the practical necessity to further such a 
debate. This question goes along with the decision when measures of tertiary prevention 
should replace approaches of secondary prevention; in other words, which institutions are 
competent and responsible. In fact, the divide between tertiary and secondary prevention is an 
important matter of institutional competences in Baden-Wuerttemberg. In the context of risk 
factors, Beutel and Weinberger call this transitionary phase “intervention” (Beutel and 
Weinberger, 2016, p. 6) and specify: 
 
 “Similar to `crisis counselling`, this is about helping individuals whom community members and 
others  - peers, friends, family, law enforcement, mental health, education, or social work 
professionals  - identify at risk engaging in violence, but who have not yet taken any significant 
steps to fulfil that intent.” (Beutel and Weinberger, 2016, p. 6) 
In Baden-Wuerttemberg, a largely useful structural separation of prevention and 
deradicalisation has been established: While civil society and non-state actors, coordinated by 












security authorities, i.e. the Ministry of the Interior8 and the police, supervise the activities in 
the tertiary sector. Hence, secondary prevention demarcates a sensitive area – the transition 
from primary-preventive approaches such as individual consultations to interventions of the 
security authorities. Exemplified in the case of Baden-Wuerttemberg, an expressed need to 
coordinate the various actors becomes clear: An alignment of prevention and deradicalisation 
approaches entails great advantages for both fields. Trained staff who have built a trustful 
relationship with a radicalising youth could intervene through pedagogical measures and avert 
security hazards reported by a youth’s social environment. In cases where these pedagogical 
approaches fail, deradicalisation programmes can be additionally implemented.  
 
Overcoming the “critical disconnect” – the alignment of prevention and deradicalisation 
Williams et al. (2015) and Thomas et al. (2017) have stressed the need to align prevention 
work and deradicalisation measures in their respective studies on community-based 
radicalisation prevention, and mechanisms of information flows directed at security 
authorities and deradicalisation programmes. Gill et al. (2014) outline the fundamental 
challenges in their study on “homegrown terrorism“: 
 
“In 82.4% of the cases, other people were aware of the individual’s grievance that spurred the terrorist 
plot, and in 79%, other individuals were aware of the individual’s commitment to a specific extremist 
ideology. In 63.9% of the cases, family and friends were aware of the individual’s intent to engage in 
terrorism-related activities because the offender verbally told them.“ (Gill et al., 2014, p. 429) 
 
This finding indicates that the direct environment of a radicalising person is the unit which 
first perceives the specific and less specific signs of the radicalisation process. However it can 
be suggested that an unspecific part of the information flow ends with the observation of those 
signs because the psychological threshold to report information appears to be very high: 
                                                 
8 The Competence Centre for the Coordination of the Prevention Network against Extremism in Baden-
Wuerttemberg (KPEBW), which was established by the Ministry of the Interior, is implementing services for 












Williams et al. (2015) revealed enlightening information in this context: On the one hand, 
they pointed out that especially friends, and relatives of radicalising individuals – so-called 
associate-gatekeepers that are exposed to the same social milieu – are in an excellent position 
to detect signs of radicalisation. As corroborated by the findings of Gill et al. (2014), these 
results contradict the hitherto pre-dominant assumption that particularly, teachers, social 
workers and religious authorities are most qualified to identify first signs of a radicalisation 
process.  
Moreover, Williams et al. (2015, p. 51) determined that persons who suspect an 
individual in their environment to radicalise do not report their observations to the competent 
service providers because they fear to betray the confidence of the person in question, or to 
endanger themselves or the allegedly radicalising individual. Findings suggest that 
particularly those professionals, that are not involved in a deradicalisation project, do not 
dependably pass on any observations or suspicions with regard to a potentially radicalising 
person to the competent points of contact or authorities. In this respect, professionals and 
persons who are close to the individual in question behave very much alike. It seems to be 
irrelevant whether the competent professional is from a security agency or a civil society 
organisation: The kind and extent of reservations towards competent institutions appear to be 
the same. This holds also true for the fears regarding the danger for themselves and the 
relationship of trust with the individual in question (Williams et al., 2015, p. 53).  
In a nutshell, this means that in contrast to previous assumptions, especially close 
friends and relatives appear to be well positioned to detect signs of radicalisation. 
Furthermore, professionals and friends or family members tend have the same reservations 
towards civil society organisations and service providers of the security authorities. Williams 
et al. (2015, p. 46) describe these reservations which constrain the flow of information 
towards consultation services as a “critical disconnect”.  
The goal must be to overcome this “critical disconnect” (Williams et al., 2015, p. 46) 
by strengthening the relationship between professionals on the one hand, and friends and 












measures targeted at gatekeepers, i.e. professionals who can act as points of contact within a 
specific environment, must be implemented at different levels. These measures should aim to 
counter the reservations of professionals towards their own colleagues who can then serve as 
contact points in their own ranks. Local structures as well as the subsequently introduced 
qualification programme can close the gaps in the chain of communication. 
Beyond this finding, Thomas et al. (2017) point out that professionals that have 
identified suspicious actions or undertakings prefer to report their observations to familiar 
points of contact such as the local police station, instead of passing on information 
anonymously to a staff member of a service hotline (Thomas et al., 2017, p. 9). Evidently, 
qualified local structures are necessary to ensure that hints are registered and investigated. To 
this end, professionals must be trained to interpret and categorise different signs of 
radicalisation in order to successfully liaise with gatekeepers. 
 
6. The prevention network PREvent!on established by the Federal State Democracy 
Centre Baden-Wuerttemberg  
 
As was shown in the preceding chapters, prevention and deradicalisation work must be 
embedded in the local context through a bottom-up strategy. At the same time, successful 
prevention and deradicalisation measures require a scientifically based approach in order to 
convey relevant knowledge to the partners on the ground. Based on these as well as the 
previously presented assumptions, an approach towards regionalising and aligning prevention 
and deradicalisation work is introduced subsequently.  
The academic discourse summarises these approaches as “government network 
approach[es; J.O.]” (Dalgaard-Nielsen, 2016, p. 135). There are a number of government 
network approaches which have been tested in practice, first and foremost, the British 
CHANNEL Programme which is one pillar of the PREVENT Strategy targeting multiple 
phenomena. This strategy implemented in England in 2012 allowed for professionals from 












partners in the field. The US model project for the establishment of “community-led 
multisector CVE programs” (Ambrozik, 2018, p. 2), initiated in 2014, instructed three regions 
– Boston, Los Angeles, and Minneapolis-St. Paul – to come up with a prevention strategy.  
The concept of the prevention network PREvent!on also relies on different approaches 
of community-based prevention work and the establishment of networks at the local level. 
Thus, it features parallels to respectively advancements of the aforementioned programmes, 
especially the CHANNEL Programme, which will be addressed in the subsequent section. 
The prevention network PREvent!on of the Federal State Democracy Centre Baden-
Wuerttemberg capitalises the qualification of pedagogical staff in municipal institutions to 
establish points of contact within existing control structures.  
The modular qualification measures are aimed to convey fundamental competences 
with regard to the implementation of prevention programmes and radicalisation assessments. 
Furthermore, the points of contact are linked and supervised by a local service provider which 
ensures the embedment into local structures. This way, prevention can also serve as an early 
warning system which – tailored to the specific infrastructure – can implement local service 
and prevention strategies and thus, obviate alarmism. 
The little available information about the British CHANNEL Programme suggests that 
the programme involves so-called “Channel Police Practitioners (CPP)” (HM Government, 
2015, p. 9)  who coordinate its implementation in the region. The activities of these CPPs vary 
across regions. They are however always affiliated with the local police station (ibid). This is 
an important difference compared to the prevention network PREvent!on: Even though the 
police are involved as an external partner in the local network, exclusively civil society 
organisations coordinate the local points of contact as well as the development of a regional 
prevention strategy. PREvent!on pursues an approach which interferes at an earlier stage, 
within the realm of primary prevention. While CHANNEL focuses on the identification and 
support of individuals at risk (HM Government, 2015, p. 5), PREvent!on also provides 
information on the phenomenon of radicalisation as well as services regarding the promotion 












Overall, the prevention network’s goal is to support the development of specific prevention 
strategies in districts through the establishment of local points of contact. Moreover, the 
prevention network aims to further train pedagogical staff as “resource persons for the 
prevention of extremism” and thus, embed knowledge about prevention and radicalisation in 
the local structures. 
 
Decentralisation of prevention through local Democracy Centres 
The local Democracy Centres operate as training, service, and networking institutions within 
the realm of radicalisation prevention. They disseminate prevention programmes in the 
districts and provide the interested public with information in terms of consultating services 
and supporting leaflets. Upon request, the Democracy Centres make specialist presentations, 
workshops, and simulation games available9 which are either realised by a qualified local 
resource person or a staff member of the Federal State Democracy Centre Baden-
Wuerttemberg. The work of the local Democracy Centres strengthens a pluralist and 
democratic society and is directed at all forms of politically and religiously motivated 
radicalisation as well as all kinds of inhuman or anti-democratic attitudes. Subsequently, the 
concept addressing the prevention of jihadist radicalisation, and the interface of prevention 
and deradicalisation will be introduced.  
After a tender submission period, the Federal State Democracy Centre Baden-
Wuerttemberg charges a bearer which operates in a district with the implementation of a local 
Democracy Centre. This assignment renders possible that the existing regional bearer network 
can be put to use to reinforce prevention work. The selection of the bearer which is supposed 
to implement the local Democracy Centre reflects the diversity of network partners within the 
different districts. While it can be useful to establish an independent point of contact in one 
district, state agencies, for instance the district administration, may be a better choice in 
another district. The local embedment of the bearer of the local point of contact is 
fundamental because the prevention concepts are transposed through existing structures – 
                                                 
9 More information on the activities and services of the Federal State Democracy Centre Baden-Wuerttemberg 












instead of establishing new networks. Practice has revealed that using existing structures to 
implement strategies and measures is easier and reduces the threshold for all actors involved. 
The submission of tailored concepts ensures that the resources of the respective bearer and the 
district are adequately allocated and that there is room for individual adjustments. The 
contract also obliges the implementing institutions to train their staff by means of the modular 
qualification programme. 
According to  Ambrozik (2018, p. 19), successful CVE strategies require – beyond the 
structural involvement of the cooperation partner – their general interest in CVE, the 
availability of sufficient resources, motivated employees and a mentoring facilitator. 
Furthermore, the local Democracy Centres interact with state agencies and partners from civil 
society aspiring to compile a local prevention strategy involving pedagogical and political 
considerations alike. Again, a wide network of institutions also encompassing local mosque 
associations and/or migrant organisations is crucial.  
The engagement of migrant and Islamic associations is based on the assumption that 
these communities contribute to the solution of the problem, not to the problem itself. The 
British CHANNEL Programme was criticised because it had defined Muslim communities as 
target group for preventive measures; thus, it did not clearly separate between religiously 
extremist groups, and those communities exercising their religion in a way that is covered by 
the right to freedom of religion (Hammonds, 2011, pp. 243–244). Moreover, especially 
Muslim associations repeatedly claimed that they had been spied on under the cover of the 
PREVENT Programme (HM Government, 2011, p. 12). An evaluation of the PREVENT 
Programme addressed these concerns and integrated a more differentiated definition of 
Islamic communities (ibid). Based on the evaluation, however, it is fairly impossible to tell if 
the engagement of Islamic and non-religious migrant organisations now relies on a resource-
based approach. 
The efforts of the local Democracy Centres follow the principle that resources 
available in the districts should be used and structures built to counter violent extremism must 












Gatekeepers’ support of deradicalisation work 
The local Democracy Centre gathers all requests regarding the prevention of extremism, and 
democracy education within the district and processes them according to the resources at 
hand. If necessary, the Federal State Democracy Centre Baden-Wuerttemberg is involved 
which then provides specialist support. Such a prevention network with a local focus, and a 
centralised, strategy development can also enrich the deradicalisation work of federal service 
providers. The current service system in the German Länder prescribes a centralised service 
hotline. Upon request, trained resource persons are sent to the persons in need of support. The 
regional structures of the prevention network PREvent!on facilitate the exchange between 
deradicalisation projects and gatekeepers on the ground by training qualified professionals to 
become qualified gatekeepers (Williams et al., 2015, p. 45). This way, the aforementioned 
“critical disconnect” between specialists and individuals in need of support can presumably be 
overcome.  
Information flows via the resource persons in two directions. On the one hand, persons 
who recognise signs of radicalisation in an individual can approach the resource persons and 
report their observations. Since the resource persons are members of the social environment 
of the person that wants to impart their concerns, the presumption is that a conversation can 
take place with a lesser risk of a breach of trust on the part of the radicalising individual than 
it would be risked in case of a direct intervention of the nationwide deradicalisation unit. The 
resource person can then collate a first assessment – if necessary, in consultation with the 
specialist units of the Federal State Democracy Centre Baden-Wuerttemberg – and provide 
recommendations for further actions. This way, trained professionals can obviate alarmism 
while solving a problem within a youth group using pedagogical tools such as workshops.  
The federal deradicalisation unit can also approach the local service providers and 
request the support of a trained resource person. This proceeding is especially reasonable 
when responding to a case which has emerged in a specific district where resource persons 
that are integrated in the individual’s social environment are available. Personal data are not 












social structures by means of a federal deradicalisation unit is not always feasible. However, 
when supplemented by the support of the resource persons trained as gatekeepers as well as 
the local Democracy Centres, the development of regional and local structures is more 
comprehensive and adjusted to the resources available on the ground.  
 
Modular qualification for resource persons 
The qualification of resource persons is based on the previously introduced definition of 
radicalisation and takes place in a modular training system. The qualification as “resource 
person for the prevention of extremism in the area of jihadist extremism” encompasses four 
modules which convey knowledge about radicalisation, the factors and signs of radicalisation, 
and the tools necessary to determine cases of radicalisation10. Expertise is imparted through 
practice-oriented methods to ensure applicability within the work environment of the future 
resource persons.  
The first module contains basic information about the approaches and structures of the 
Federal State Democracy Centre Baden-Wuerttemberg and offers annually changing focus 
topics. Participants receive the opportunity to learn about the state-wide specialist units as 
well as the qualification programmes. The second module is a two-day introductory course. 
Participants acquire fundamental knowledge about the Islamic religion, the distinction 
between Islam and the Salafist ideology, and about the understanding of radicalisation 
underlying the concept of prevention. These insights are consolidated and complemented with 
practical exercises in a third two-day module. Furthermore, this module offers a glimpse of 
the practice of deradicalisation. Participants can choose a thematic focus for the fourth 
consecutive module. Further information is provided in a reader which participants can use to 
expand their knowledge. Following the programme, trained resource persons can choose to 
learn about workshops and simulation games which they can realise in their institutions, and 
potentially in the catchment area of their contact point. Becoming a gatekeeper, i.e. a 
                                                 
10 Furthermore, the Federal State Democracy Centre Baden-Wuerttemberg offers modular qualification 













“resource person for deradicalisation” requires another one-day seminar which provides an 
introduction of the basics of deradicalisation work. The intersections of prevention work and 
deradicalisation are pointed out in cooperation with the state-wide operating CVE relevant 
service provider. Resource persons trained in deradicalisation, Salafist ideology and 
radicalisation factors that also obtain pedagogical skills can offer crucial support to staff of 
deradicalisation projects in terms of developing local resources. 
 
7. Conclusion and discussion 
 
The previously introduced concept of a regional prevention network demonstrates the 
possibility to establish an early warning system with respect to the radicalisation of youths, to 
align preventive approaches along the stages of the prevention triad and ultimately with 
deradicalisation measures. Furthermore, the concept provides an opportunity to reconcile 
local prevention programmes and reduce the psychological threshold for persons in need of 
support by means of training resource persons as gatekeepers. Embedding prevention in 
regional and local structures allows for the exploitation of existing networks, resources, and 
competences which are tailored to the local specificities and requirements. At the same time, 
the centralised development of qualification measures as well as the cooperation with 
academia and policy-makers ensures a connection with the relevant (international) discourses 
and scholarship.  
Of course there are obstacles with regard to implementing a contact point within the 
local context. Due to their interface function, the training of gatekeepers must convey the 
expertise to adequately assess suspected cases of radicalisation. Yet, the qualification of 
resource persons must not exceed the budget for advanced training available in an institution. 
This challenge requires an optimised preparation of training contents. Professionals must be 
aware of the activities performed by contact points, and gatekeepers in the catchment areas to 
maximise the effects of the network. Therefore, the embedment of the local bearer should be a 












Furthermore, permanent positions for trained professionals are desirable to achieve a fast, and 
comprehensive implementation of the concept. At present, funded points of contact/service 
providers have been established in five districts in Baden-Wuerttemberg. Within the next 
years, an evaluation of their activities will provide insights into the challenges, needs and day-
to-day work of the partners on the ground. Additional support and adjustments will be 
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